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• Merchant internalization is a key reason for the biases in the interchange fees set by card platforms.
• Existing conditions under which merchant internalization holds are unified and extended.
• Merchant Internalization holds in a general discrete choice model.
• Merchant Internalization holds in a representative consumer model.
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 4 September 2014
Received in revised form
3 October 2014
Accepted 10 October 2014
Available online 18 October 2014
Keywords:
Merchant internalization
Payment cards
Interchange fees
a b s t r a c t
Merchant internalization has been proposed as a key reason for biases in the setting of fees in payment
card platforms. It has been shown to hold under several specific models of imperfect competition. This
paper unifies and extends the existing payment card literature by showing that merchant internalization
holds under a very general model of competition.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).l1. Introduction
Debit and credit card services are typically offered through pay-
ment card platforms, like Visa and MasterCard, which involve two
sides, consumers and merchants. In some articles in the literature,
it is assumed that merchants accept payment cards only when
the transactional benefit they get from card transaction exceeds
the merchant fee they are charged. For instance, Baxter (1983),
Schmalensee (2002), Wright (2003), and Bedre-Defolie and Cal-
vano (2013) all have this property. However, in other articles in
the literature, it is shown that when merchants set a single price
regardless of how consumers pay, merchants also accept cards for
strategic reasons, even if their transactional benefit of doing so is
lower than the merchant fee they face. This has been used to ex-
plain why merchant fees may be set too high.
In Rochet and Tirole (2002), the Hotelling model is considered
and it is shown that under the no-surcharge rule in which mer-
chants set a single retail price, there is an equilibrium where mer-
chants accept cards whenever the merchant fee they face is less
than the sum of their transactional benefit and average benefit
their customers get from using cards.
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0/).Rochet and Tirole (2011) show the same condition applies in
the Salop (1979) circular city model of competition. In these mod-
els, merchants that accept cards can attract consumers from the ri-
vals who do not (or equivalently, can raise their retail prices while
maintaining a given market share). Merchants take this into ac-
count when deciding how much to pay to accept cards. This has
been called ‘‘merchant internalization’’ in the literature. Wright
(2012) shows how merchant internalization leads card platforms
to charge merchants too much and cardholders too little.
Some recent literature has explored whether merchant inter-
nalization is a robust feature of market competition between mer-
chants.Wright (2010) considers a linear demandmodel of Cournot
competition between merchants, which allows aggregate demand
to be elastic. He shows that the equilibrium condition of card ac-
ceptance remains the same. The same equilibrium condition has
also been shown by Ding andWright (2014) for the general Perloff
and Salop (1985) competition setting.
In this paper we show that provided all consumers hold cards
and decide whether to use cards at the point of sale, the merchant
internalization condition holds for any differentiated oligopoly
market setting regardless of whether merchants compete in prices
or quantities. This includes a general discrete choice model and
a general representative consumer oligopoly model. These results
help shed light on the reason why merchant internalization holds,
which is fundamentally that merchants are willing to pay to offer
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.
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cards.
Obviously, there are also situations where merchant internal-
ization does not hold. If consumers are not aware of whether mer-
chants accept cardswhen they decidewhichmerchant to buy from,
then in most settings of competition, merchants cannot attract
more consumers or sustain a higher price by accepting cards, and
merchant internalization will not apply. If merchants have their
prices capped for some reason, so they cannot raise their prices
in response to higher willingness to pay in case they accept cards,
then merchant internalization will not apply. An example is given
byWright (2003) who considers a monopoly merchant facing unit
demands that sets its price to leave no surplus for consumers pay-
ing by cash. If the merchant raises its price, it loses all cash-paying
consumers, which is assumed unprofitable. Thus, the monopoly
merchant does not obtain any benefit from cardholders’ increased
willingness to pay and somerchant internalization does not apply.
2. Payment card platformmodel
We adopt a standard setup of a payment card platform follow-
ing Wright (2012). Consumers or buyers (referred to as B), decide
whether to use cards to pay. They get a convenience benefit bB and
pay a per transaction fee pB in each card transaction (which can
be negative to reflect rewards). Merchants or sellers (referred to as
S) decide whether to accept cards. They get a convenience bene-
fit bS and pay a per transaction fee pS in each card transaction. For
consumers, the benefit can be interpreted as the additional bene-
fit of using cards as opposed to using an alternative, e.g. cash. For
merchants, the benefit can be interpreted as the additional bene-
fit (i.e. cost saving) of accepting cards as opposed to accepting an
alternative. For consumers, suppose bB is continuously distributed
in the interval [bB, b¯B] according to the density function hB(bB) and
distribution functionHB(bB).DB(·) = 1−HB(·) is the survival func-
tion of consumers’ interaction benefit. We assume that merchants
in a given market obtain the same bS per card transaction.
The benefit bS is assumed to be known to merchants before
they decide whether to accept cards or not. The benefit bB is drawn
at the point of sale. Following Wright (2004) and the subsequent
literature, we assume that all consumers hold cards, so that there
is no consumer heterogeneity regarding convenience benefit from
using cards at the point consumers choose between merchants.
Suppose for the payments made between consumers and mer-
chants, consumers face the same price from merchants whether
they pay by card or other alternatives, e.g. cash. This could be due
to a no-surcharge rule that prevents merchants from adding a sur-
charge when consumers pay by card. Thus, facing the same price,
consumers use cards if and only if bB ≥ pB. The average consumer
benefit is defined as βB(pB) = E(bB|bB ≥ pB). The difference
between the average and marginal consumer’s benefit, which is
called consumers’ inframarginal surplus per interaction or ex-
pected consumer surplus per transaction, is defined as vB(pB) =
E(bB|bB ≥ pB)− pB.
In the existing literature, it is shown that there is an equilibrium
in which all merchants accept cards under the following merchant
internalization condition:
bS + vB (pB) ≥ pS . (1)
In this paper, we focus on a general discrete choice model and
a general representative consumer model, and consider whether
merchant internalization applies in these models.
3. General discrete choice model
We detail a general discrete choice model of product differen-
tiation and show how it gives rise to (1). There are N merchants
and M consumers in the market. We assume that the utility con-
sumer i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} gets when she buys from merchant j ∈{1, 2, . . . ,N} is ui,j = ϵi,j − pj in which ϵi,j represents the match
value of merchant j’s product for consumer i and pj is the price of
merchant j’s product. We assume that ϵi,j, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M}, j ∈{1, 2, . . . ,N} follow general distributions over some interval
which is a subset of R and has lowest value ϵ. The draws could be
correlated among merchants and consumers. A special case would
be where ϵi,j is drawn i.i.d. from a common distribution for all con-
sumers, in which case the model would correspond to the Perloff
and Salop (1985) model. When the distribution takes the double-
exponential form, this would just be the logit model. Merchant j
has a marginal cost cj per unit sold and its output is denoted as
qj, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,N}.
We assume that consumers buy either one or zero unit of the
product and the (indirect) utility of no purchase is normalized to
zero. Thus, to ensure consumers always prefer to buy from one
of the merchants, we need ϵ to be sufficiently high. We have the
following conclusion.
Proposition 1. In the general discrete choice model, there exists an
equilibrium in which all merchants accept cards if and only if bS +
vB (pB) ≥ pS .
Proof. Suppose there is an equilibrium in which all merchants
accept cards and the equilibrium prices of all merchants other than
merchant j are denoted by the vector p∗−j. Merchant j chooses pj to
maximize its profit function:
πj = (pj − cj − (pS − bS)DB(pB))qj(pj, p∗−j). (2)
Suppose instead merchant j deviates to reject cards. If consumers
buy from merchant j and pay by cash, their utility will be lowered
by vB(pB)DB(pB), which is equivalent to the price of merchant j
being increasedbyvB(pB)DB(pB). Thenmerchant j’s profit becomes:
πj = (pj − cj)qj(pj + vB(pB)DB(pB), p∗−j). (3)
Define p′j = pj + vB(pB)DB(pB). Then (3) can be rewritten as:
π ′j = (p′j − cj − vB(pB)DB(pB))qj(p′j, p∗−j). (4)
Comparing (4) with (2), it is clear that maxp′j π
′
j > maxpj πj if pS >
bS + vB(pB)DB(pB), maxp′j π ′j < maxpj πj if pS < bS + vB(pB)DB(pB)
and maxp′j π
′
j = maxpj πj if pS = bS + vB(pB)DB(pB). Thus there is
an equilibrium in which all merchants accept cards if and only if
bS + vB(pB)DB(pB) ≥ pS . 
In the general discrete choicemodel, merchants’ marginal costs
are increased by pS − bS from accepting cards. Since consumers all
draw their convenience benefit at the point of sale, consumerswith
convenience benefit higher than consumer fee will pay by card.
Theirwillingness to pay increases by vB (pB)when they pay by card.
Reflecting this, merchants could pass on the increase of cost into
higher retail prices. Under the merchant internalization condition,
the increase of consumers’ willingness to pay (weakly) exceeds the
increase in the merchants’ marginal costs. Thus merchants’ profit
margins are (weakly) increased by accepting cards and they are
willing to accept cards in equilibrium.
4. Representative consumer model
We consider an oligopoly market with n merchants. Each
merchant (j = 1, 2, . . . , n) has a constant marginal cost cj of
production. Merchants compete in quantities or prices. The indi-
cator variable Ij is defined to take the value 1 if merchant j accepts
cards, and 0 if not. We assume that outputs are heterogeneous
in the sense that different merchants produce different products
and each consumer purchases products from all merchants. A rep-
resentative consumer’ utility function from purchasing goods is
u (q1, q2, . . . , qn) = f (q1, q2, . . . , qn)+nj=1 DB (pB) vB (pB) Ijqj−n
j=1 pjqj in which qj represents the quantity of the good a
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by merchant j, j = 1, 2, . . . , n and f (q1, q2, . . . , qn) is a smooth
and strictly concave function1 of (q1, q2, . . . , qn). We have the fol-
lowing conclusion.
Proposition 2. In the representative consumer model, there exists
an equilibrium in which all merchants accept cards if and only if
bS + vB (pB) ≥ pS .
Proof. The representative consumer’s utility function from pur-
chasing goods is
u(q1, q2, . . . , qn) = f (q1, q2, . . . , qn)
+
n
j=1
DB(pB)vB(pB)Ijqj −
n
j=1
pjqj.
From first order condition of utility maximization, we have
∂ f
∂qj
(q1, q2, . . . , qn)+ DB(pB)vB(pB)Ij = pj,
j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (5)
(i) If merchants compete in quantities, we define lj(q1, q2, . . . , qn)
= ∂ f
∂qj
(q1, q2, . . . , qn), j = 1, 2, . . . , n and merchant j’s profit is
πj = qj(lj(q1, q2, . . . , qn)− cj − IjDB(pB)(pS − bS − vB(pB))).
When bS+vB(pB) ≥ pS , merchant j’s profit margin is increased if it
accepts cards. Thus we have an equilibrium inwhich all merchants
accept cards if and only if bS + vB(pB) ≥ pS .
(ii) If merchants compete in prices, denote p˜j = pj − DB(pB)
vB(pB)Ij, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, from (5), we could derive qj(p˜1, p˜2,
. . . , p˜n), then merchant j′s profit is written as
πj = qj(p˜1, p˜2, . . . , p˜n)(p˜j − cj − IjDB(pB)× (pS − bS − vB(pB))).
1 From Vives (2001), we know that when utility function of a representative
consumer is smooth and strictly concave, the demand and inverse demand
functions derived are downward-slopping.When bS+vB(pB) ≥ pS , merchant j’s profit margin is increased if it
accepts cards. Thus we have an equilibrium inwhich all merchants
accept cards if and only if bS + vB(pB) ≥ pS . 
From the utility function, we can derive the demand function
and inverse demand function. When merchant internalization
holds, accepting cards increases a merchant’s profit margin if
it accepts cards regardless of whether merchants compete in
quantities or prices. The intuition is the same as in the discrete
choice model. What matters is only whether each merchant’s
margin is (weakly) increasedwhen it accepts cards, which happens
if and only if merchant internalization holds. The homogeneous
Cournot model analyzed in Wright (2010) is just a special case of
this model.
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